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We assess the role of local public goods provision for gender gaps in the labour 
market. We find that higher fiscal revenues of local governments are associated with 
decreasing gender employment gaps in German labour market areas because it 
decreases labour supply for male workers at a higher rate than for female workers. 
The results are robust when we include instrumental variables that address the 
endogeneity of local public goods provision. To assess the impact of fiscal transfers 
across regions on gender gaps we quantify a spatial general equilibrium model with 
multiple types of workers, who are differently affected by local public goods 
provision in their labour supply decision. We find that transfers reduce disparities 
across regions. This goes along with smaller gender gaps in employment in treated 
regions because female workers are disproportionately pulled into market work and 
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A Introduction
Despite substantial convergence in labour market outcomes across gender over the last
decades, there are still wide discrepancies between male and female workers, especially
concerning their labour market attachment (Goldin, 2014). To better accommodate female
labour supply, many governments invest massively in their public childcare infrastructure
(Blau and Currie, 2006; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). Local governments, however, often
lack sufficient fiscal resources to invest in the provision of public goods, such as child care.
As a result, many countries shift substantial public resources across jurisdictions (Henkel
et al., 2021) to ease budget constraints and provide public goods at the local level. These
circumstances raise several important questions: What is the role of local public goods
in explaining spatial differences in male-to-female employment rates (henceforth, gender
employment gaps)? How does the provision of local public goods affect the distribution
of economic activity across space? What are the aggregate consequences of public policies
for welfare and gender gaps?
In this paper, we study these issues by investigating the impact of local tax revenues
after redistribution (henceforth, fiscal capacities) on gender employment gaps and the dis-
tribution of economic activity across German labour markets. Our analysis consists of
three parts. In the first part, we develop a quantitative spatial model with heterogeneous
workers and intergovernmental transfers. The theoretical model features selective sorting
across local labour markets and sectors as well as extensive labour supply decisions of
female and male workers. In the second part, we employ individual employment and wage
data from social security records, together with unique data on tax revenues and transfers
at the local level, to structurally estimate the model parameters. In particular, we use
infrastructure investments in local childcare as instruments for local fiscal capacities to
assess the effect of local public goods provision on the labour supply decisions of hetero-
geneous workers in the spatial economy. The third step concerns policy analysis: we use
the estimated parameters and the model structure to simulate counterfactual policy ex-
periments. In a scenario without fiscal equalization, there are substantial shocks to fiscal
capacities because solely tax revenues at the local level finance the provision of public
goods. In doing so, we quantify the aggregate economic consequences from local public
goods provision on the employment decisions of female and male workers and characterize
the spatial implications of fiscal transfers for gender employment gaps.
Identifying the effects of fiscal capacity shocks on employment rates is challenging.
Theoretically, there are different channels through which changes in local tax revenues
and public goods provision could affect the labour supply decision of heterogeneous work-
ers. On the one hand, there is a trade-off between public goods provision and labour force
participation. Financing local public goods requires higher tax rates, which disincen-
tivizes workers to supply labour by decreasing real wage income (henceforth, the ”income
effect”). On the other hand, there is a long empirical literature (see ”Related Literature”
below) that documents how a higher provision of different components of local public
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goods may increase labour force participation, especially for female workers (henceforth,
the ”substitution effect”). For example, a higher availability or affordability of public
childcare increases the opportunity costs of young parents to raise their children privately
and facilitates their return to the workplace (Blau and Currie, 2006). In our theoretical
framework, each worker, therefore, faces an individual-specific trade-off between remaining
in the home-market sector and supplying labour because employment is costly, or workers
dislike to work (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Chauvin, 2018). As a shortcut to the substitution
effect, we further allow this trade-off to depend on the level of local public goods, such
that higher public goods provision pulls workers into employment.
From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear which of these effects dominate such that
the total impact of fiscal shocks on local employment rates is ambiguous ex-ante. First,
higher tax rates are likely to reduce employment for female and male workers via the income
effect. However, when only higher fiscal transfers shift fiscal revenues, local labour force
participation rates are not affected as workers in donor regions bear the tax burden. Third,
the substitution effect could attenuate the initial negative employment effect. Furthermore,
as long as the substitution effect is substantially higher for female than male workers,
higher public good provision is likely to adversely affect female employment to a smaller
extent than for male workers, reducing gender employment gaps. Fourth, by affecting the
relative attractiveness of a region, fiscal shocks induce workers to move to other locations.
In our theoretical model, only employed workers are free to move across space and sectors,
whereas non-employed workers receive cash transfers that constrain them to their place
of residence. As long as migration responses are higher for male workers (Ahlfeldt et al.,
2020), positive fiscal capacity shocks are then likely to increase gender employment gaps.
Besides, the spatial economy might be affected by various externalities that individuals
do not recognize when making location decisions. For instance, individuals overlook their
impact on others via different agglomeration and congestion forces as well as of their
labour supply decision on the provision of public goods. By reducing over-congestion
in cities and pulling female workers into market work, public policies that are location-
specific may therefore actually mitigate rather than exacerbate misallocations and gender
employment gaps.
We take our model to the data to investigate the employment effects of local public
goods provision and fiscal transfers in practice. The quantification of the model is de-
manding because it requires us to break down tax revenues from several governmental
layers (Federal, States, and local municipalities) to the local level and identify the actual
degree of fiscal transfers (within and between the Federal States). To obtain empirical
proxies of the average tax and transfer rates, we follow Henkel et al. (2021) to compute for
every district local tax revenues before and after redistribution (and hence net transfers).
Our approach assigns these aggregate variables to the 141 German local labour markets
(Arbeitsmarktregionen) and relates them to local value-added. Our numbers suggest that
despite substantial redistribution of around 10 percent of aggregate tax revenues per year,
there are wide discrepancies of local fiscal capacities per capita across local labour mar-
2
kets. Peripheral regions (especially in former East Germany) have higher fiscal capacities
per capita. For example, in Berlin, annual fiscal revenues per capita exceed 12, 000 euros.
Rural regions in western and southern Germany comprising the set of net contributors
tend to have resources at their disposal that are up to 20 percent smaller (or 2, 500 Euro
per annum and inhabitant).
To structurally estimate the gender-specific impact of local public goods on (non-)
employment rates, we leverage the time variation within German labour market areas’
employment rates induced by fiscal capacity shocks. The German setting is ideal to an-
alyze the effect of fiscal shocks on gender-specific employment since there is substantial
remaining variance in gender-specific employment rates across local labour markets. Most
importantly, the spatial variation in transfers across the 141 German local labour markets
is not affected by gender-specific employment outcomes. Time-varying preference shocks,
however, pose a challenge for causal identification. They would shift out local labour
supply and correlate with fiscal capacity as well as price level shocks. Building upon
Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) and Colas and Hutchinson (2021) we, therefore, construct two
sets of instrumental variables to address these endogeneity concerns: First, we use time
variation in the inverse-distance-weighted average of childcare rates in all neighbouring
regions to construct an instrument. Furthermore, we leverage the variation in exposure to
national tax revenue shocks by tax type (for example, housing, VAT, business, or income
tax revenues) across labour market regions to construct Bartik-style instruments.
Our IV estimates imply that a positive fiscal capacity shock affects labour supply of
female and male workers differently. The substitution effect almost cancels out the income
effect for female workers and is fifty percent larger than the male workers’ estimate. In
other words, increases in employment rates for male workers are subdued in regions that
experience large increases in local fiscal revenues, but female labour force participation is
barely affected by fiscal capacity shocks. As a result, the IV estimates predict declining
gender employment gaps in response to positive fiscal capacity shocks. Our estimates
imply that an increase in fiscal capacity per capita by 1 percent decreases differences in
male-to-female non-employment by about 1.22 percent. As a result, the average real tax
revenue increase of about 14 percent between the years 2008 to 2014, our main observation
period, decreased non-employment gaps in local labour markets by around 1.34 percentage
points (relative to an initial non-employment gap of on average 7.86 percentage points in
2008).
In our counterfactual scenario, where we abolish the fiscal transfer system, we observe
migration out of the former recipient and towards the former donor regions. In parallel,
we find smaller gender employment gaps but larger wage gaps compared to the initial
equilibrium. With our baseline specification, our counterfactual simulations imply that
gender employment gaps would increase by 2.6% in former recipient regions (mainly in
Eastern Germany), and wage gaps increase by 0.1% in the transition to a new long-
run spatial equilibrium. The biggest metropolitan areas such as Frankfurt or Munich
would see decreases in employment gaps, whereas wage gaps increase for all regions. We
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find that welfare slightly decreases between the two equilibria. Summing up, our baseline
counterfactual suggests that fiscal redistribution of local tax revenues tends to (marginally)
widen overall gender employment gaps in employment.
Related literature. Recent empirical literature documents how a higher provision of
different components of local public goods increases labour force participation, especially
of female workers. Indeed most of the empirical literature tends to find significant positive
effects of the availability of public childcare facilities on labour supply decisions, particu-
larly of young mothers (see Blau and Currie (2006) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) for
an overview). Besides, public spending on nursing home places for the elderly has positive
employment effects for older women since they are more likely to care for their elderly rel-
atives (Bolin et al., 2008; Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Crespo and Mira, 2014). Finally,
investments in public transport infrastructure via decreased commuting costs (Le Bar-
banchon et al., 2021; Black et al., 2014; Liu and Su, 2021), faster broadband internet
facilitating working from home and increasing worker productivity (Dettling, 2017; Bloom
et al., 2015; Burstein et al., 2019), health care through improving access to fertility treat-
ment (Moreno-Maldonado and Santamaria, 2021), or access to job centers (Kunze and
Troske, 2012) may have higher positive employment effects for female workers. This paper
bridges a gap between this empirical literature, which credibly identifies causal effects of
public policies on extensive labour supply, and general equilibrium models, which allow
making predictions about counterfactual outcomes and welfare in the spatial economy.
In doing so, this paper adds to the literature on quantitative spatial models. It builds
upon the class of quantitative spatial models featuring occupational sorting under worker
heterogeneity and type-specific comparative advantage (Burstein et al., 2019, 2020; Hsieh
et al., 2019; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Lee, 2020). But, we extend this framework in
two directions: First, we add regional sorting of heterogeneous workers to incorporate
recent advances in the quantitative spatial economics literature (Allen and Arkolakis,
2014; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015; Monte et al., 2018; Bryan and Morten, 2018; Heblich et al.,
2020). More importantly, in this paper, we model the extensive labour supply decisions
of heterogeneous workers. In our setting, female workers disproportionally profit from
increases in local fiscal capacities and the provision of local public goods by pulling them
into employment. So far, the literature mainly abstracts from non-employment, while
incorporating it affects the policy implications drawn from public policies (Bilal, 2020).
Besides the already mentioned literature, our paper also closely relates to the litera-
ture on the effect of local taxes and transfers on the spatial sorting of workers (Bastani
et al., 2020; Colas and Hutchinson, 2021; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020) and firms (Fa-
jgelbaum et al., 2019; Serrato and Zidar, 2016). The effect of fiscal capacity shocks on
employment is closest to the macroeconomic literature using geographic variation in fiscal
expenditures over time to estimate multipliers. Chodorow-Reich (2019) gives a thorough
review of the literature, which mainly covers the 2008 crisis and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act. Another strand of literature has focused on the spillovers of local
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public employment on private sector employment driven by increases in local expenditures
(Faggio and Overman, 2014; Moretti, 2010; Guillouzouic et al., 2021) or local amenity
spillovers as in Becker et al. (2021). In this paper, we argue that the employment effects of
fiscal shocks may be higher for female than male workers. It has been widely documented
in the literature that different selection and sorting of male and female workers account for
a large part of the remaining gender gaps across local labour markets and occupations (see
Blau and Kahn (2017); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) and Black and Spitz-Oehner (2010);
Calvo et al. (2021) for Germany). However, the aggregate implication of the allocation of
female and male workers across local labour markets and market sectors for the economy
remains unclear. We add to this literature by showing how the provision of public goods
affects selection and gender convergence in general equilibrium.
The rest of the paper reads as follows. Section B describes the institutional setting
of local public goods provision and fiscal equalization in Germany. Further, it presents
empirical evidence on a negative relationship between gender employment gaps and fiscal
capacities at the local level. We introduce the spatial model with heterogeneous agents
and fiscal transfers in Section C. Section D describes our data Section, while section E
explains how we quantify the model for Germany. The counterfactual analysis is presented
in Section F and Section G concludes.
B Institutional Background and Motivating Facts
Article 28 of the German constitution provides the legal basis for regulating local public
goods provision in Germany. It guarantees cities, municipalities, and districts the right
of local self-government. As a result, they care for everything that neither the 16 State
governments (the ”Länder”) nor the Federal government are responsible for. At the same
time, federal or state laws regulate that the municipalities have to provide their citizens
with specific public goods. These include, for example, childcare, elementary schools,
drinking, and sewage supply, energy and waste management, a fire department, municipal
elections, and social institutions. More specifically, municipalities have to build and main-
tain a sufficient number of kindergartens, nurseries, schools and other child care facilities,
but how they do this is their own decision. The financial needs of municipalities then
depend on the size and demographic composition of their population.
Lower fiscal revenues limit municipalities in providing local public goods, whereas
larger fiscal capacities allow higher public spending. Panel (a) of Figure 1 highlights this
relationship. Fiscal capacities per capita are normalized by the working-age population
in 2008 and demeaned by their yearly average. The positive relationship indicates that
a higher budget of local governments allows providing more public goods. When fiscal
budgets are tight, there is no alternative but to save on the provision and maintenance
of local public goods, like libraries, swimming pools, parks, youth centers, nurseries, and
retirement homes.1 As a case in point, Panel (b) of Figure 1 highlights the importance of
1The financial situation of some municipalities deteriorated when Germany introduced the so-called
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Figure 1: Public goods provision and local fiscal capacities per capita
(a) Public goods provision (b) Childcare provision
Note: Panel (a) plots an aggregate measure of local public goods provision against fiscal capacity per capita,
normalized by the working-age population in 2008 and demeaned by their yearly average. Panel (b) links fiscal
capacities per capita to a measure of childcare provision. We use available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution to
measure fiscal capacities. Local tax revenues and transfer payments are based on our calculations. We follow the
approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution
and regional transfer payments (that is negative for donors and positive for recipients). Public goods and childcare
provision are the outcomes of a first principal component analysis on different measures of public good provision,
including, among others, various measures of local public childcare in nurseries and kindergartens, access to fast
broadband internet, public transport, and highway infrastructure, as well as investment in retirement homes, local
recreational areas, or waste management. See section D of the main paper for details. The size of the marker is
proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR (2020) and Statistisches Bundesamt
(2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021).
sufficient fiscal capacities for local governments to provide public childcare.
To ensure that the local jurisdictions have sufficient fiscal capacities the Federal gov-
ernment and States distribute tax revenues across the different government layers and
allocate them to the single States and municipalities according to a complicated set of
rules. The legal basis provides Article 72 of the German Constitution according to which
living conditions should be ”equivalent” across the country. But, despite large-scale fiscal
transfers from the Federal government to the States and local jurisdictions in the size of
around 53.5 billion Euro per year (that is 10 percent of the aggregate tax revenue), there
are still profound and persistent spatial disparities (see Henkel et al. (2021)). Panel (a)
of Figure 2 shows considerable variation in the local tax revenues per capita after redis-
tribution - both across and within States. As can be seen, the fiscal equalization scheme
in Germany endows peripheral regions (especially in former East Germany) with higher
fiscal capacities per capita. Here, annual local tax revenues per capita exceed 12,000 euros
(for example, in Berlin, the nation’s capital). By contrast, rural regions in western and
southern Germany tend to have fiscal resources that are up to 20 percent smaller (or 2,500
Euro per annum and inhabitant).
”Schuldenbremse” in 2009. Since then, Article 109 of the German constitution explicitly prescribes the
principle of a balanced budget without net borrowing in a given year for the federal and state governments.
Moreover, Article 115 of the Constitution limits net borrowing at the federal level to 0.35 % of national
GDP; see Busch and Strehl (2019) for an overview.
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Figure 2: Spatial disparities
(a) Fiscal capacities per capita (b) Gender employment gaps
Notes: This figure plots the geographical pattern of fiscal capacities per capita in Panel (a) and of em-
ployment gaps in Panel (b) across the 141 German local labour markets (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012) for
the years 2008− 2014. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities as the
sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for donors
and positive for recipients). The gender employment gap measures male-to-female employment rates. The
employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour force relative to the total
number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years). Data comes from the INKAR
(2020) database. Darker shading indicates higher values.
At the same time, as Panel (b) of Figure 2 documents, there are still substantial
differences in gender employment gaps across German local labour markets. Female em-
ployment rates are higher in the Eastern and Southern parts of Germany. For example,
rates exceed 84 percent along the Swiss border leading to lower gender employment gaps.
Some cities of the Ruhr Area, on the other hand, have far lower female employment rates
and higher gender employment gaps, for example, Bochum with less than 70 % of women
in employment.
Besides these profound disparities, there exists a negative (positive) relationship be-
tween fiscal capacities per capita and gender (non-)employment gaps across German local
labour markets. Figure 5 shows that gender (non-)employment gaps decrease (increase)
in fiscal capacity per capita. It plots the gender (non-)employment gaps against fiscal
capacity per capita, normalized by the working-age population in 2008. Both variables are
demeaned by their 2008-2014 regional mean and set relative to the yearly average. Figure
1 in the Online Appendix H shows the underlying employment effects for female and male
workers separately.
Identifying a causal effect imposes one fundamental challenge: the change in local
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Figure 3: Gender employment gaps and local fiscal capacities per capita
(a) Employment gaps (b) Non-Employment gaps
Note: This figure plots demeaned log (non-)employment gaps (relative to the regional and year specific mean) against
the identically demeaned fiscal capacity per capita. Both variables are normalized by the working-age population
in 2008. Fiscal capacities measure available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution. Local tax revenues and transfer
payments are based on own our calculations. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal
capacities as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for
donors and positive for recipients). The gender (non-)employment gap measures male-to-female (non-)employment
rates. The employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour force relative to the total
number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years) in the local labour market. The size of the
marker is proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR (2020) and Statistisches
Bundesamt (2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021).
fiscal capacities must be exogenous to labour supply shocks. In the empirical part of the
paper, we address this endogeneity concern by using several instrumental variables on the
regional level. In the next section, we move forward and set up a quantitative model
featuring heterogeneous workers that react differently to fiscal revenue shocks and local
public goods provision in extensive labour supply to motivate our empirical approach and
the choice of instrumental variables.
C A Quantitative Spatial Model with Extensive Labour Sup-
ply of Heterogeneous Workers
We develop a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model featuring sorting of heteroge-
neous workers across local labour markets (Diamond, 2016; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2019),
local governments supplying local public goods (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019; Henkel et al.,
2021), and extensive labour supply decisions of heterogeneous worker groups (Chauvin,
2018) in a unified framework. We add selection into occupational sectors based on com-
parative advantage or type-specific preferences (Hsieh et al., 2019; Burstein et al., 2020).
The economy consists of J regions and S sectors (one of which is the home market
sector). There is a continuous mass of workers L in the economy with a total number of
Lg workers bound to a specific type g ∈ G. After deciding whether to work in any of the
M market sectors, employed workers move freely across regions and sectors. They decide
8
on the workplace depending on where to achieve the highest utility given each worker’s
level of human capital and preferences.
C.1 Workers
Preferences. Each worker ω of type g derives utility from the consumption of local final
goods, local public goods, and from working and living in a given region i ∈ J and sector
s ∈ S. To maximize utility the budget-constrained worker chooses consumption bundles
Ci,su of local final consumption goods at prices Pi,u in all market sectors u ∈ {1, ...,M}
according to


















with shares βu over the consumption of local final goods satisfying
∑
u∈M βu = 1. η
g
i,s is
a region-sector-specific preference component varying across worker types. Ri/L
χ
i denotes
the utility derived from a local public good Ri in region i, where α is the preference weight
of the government sector and χ ∈ (0, 1) governs the extent of public goods rivalry.
Consumption. Denoting as Igi,s(ω) the after-tax income of worker ω employed in region






which is increasing in individual income but decreasing in local prices.
Preference shifters. The preference shifter ηgi,s is a function of a component common









We assume that workers in region i incur positive sector-specific participation costs
µgi,s ≥ 0 in terms of utility units when joining either of the sectors. Staying in the home
market sector imposes no participation costs, such that we normalize µgi,h = 0 for all regions
i ∈ J and groups g ∈ G. To account for the fact that workers of different gender have
varying preferences for regions (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020) and occupations (Wiswall and Zafar
(2018)), we allow amenities and participation costs to differ by worker group. Theoretically,
this may come from gender-specific differences in the preferences for flexible hours (Erosa et
al. (2017); Wasserman (2019), non-convexities of hourly labour supply (Cha and Weeden,
2014; Cubas et al., 2019)), or the possibility of working from home (Dingel and Neiman
(2020)).
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Substituting the equilibrium values from (1) in the utility function, we can write the
indirect utility for a worker ω of type g working in occupation s and living in region i as
a function of the real wage, local public goods and the preference parameter ηgi,s:













βu the region-specific price index.
C.2 Market sectors
In a first stage, all workers decide on whether to join the labour force or remain in the home
market sector, incorporating an optimal choice of employment in any of the N ∗M het-
erogeneous region-sector pairs in the second stage. This modelling choice endogenizes the
local number of workers in the home market Lgi,h and the market sectors L
g
i,m. Aggregate



















Heterogeneous human capital. Employed workers of a given type differ with respect
to their individual-specific human capital level. In the following we denote the idiosyncratic
human capital level of a worker of type g living and working in region i and sector s as
Ψgi,s(ω) ≡ Ψ
g
d(ω). The human capital level is composed of the individual ability level a ∈ A
of each worker, and the acquired education level e ∈ E . The distribution of individual-
specific ability a does not differ across workers of different types g. Workers of different
types, however, differ with respect to their opportunity costs of acquiring human capital
for working in specific sectors. Hence, we model the heterogeneity of employed workers as
the result of random human capital draws coming from a type-specific Fréchet distribution:











with θg > 1 and Ψ̃i,s = Ψ
1−α
i,s . The shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution
governs the dispersion of random human capital draws inside each region-sector pair. For
high values of θg there is low variance in the idiosyncratic draws. The parameter θg then
governs the size of within-type comparative advantage in the spirit of Eaton and Kortum
(2002).
Selection and Sorting. After having decided on whether to join the labour force,
each employed worker ω of type g receives human capital draws for all market sectors
according to distribution (4). Associated with these human capital draws is a level of
potential wages in each sector and region. Next, given their human capital draws and
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the preference shifters for all region-sector pairs {i, s} all employed workers jointly and
simultaneously decide to move to the specific occupation s and local labor market i that
maximizes their utility (3), such that worker ω’s indirect utility after selection and sorting
is Vgi,s(ω) = maxi∈N,s∈S V
g
i,s(ω).
Worker Compensation. The wage income of employed workers is given by







where T gi,s > 0 governs the average human capital of workers of type g in region i
for sector s and w̃gi,s is the wage per effective unit of labour. To account for the fact
that female and male workers might differ concerning their average educational level in
some region-sector pairs, we allow the average human capital levels to differ across gender
(Greenwood et al., 2016).
Using the properties of the Fréchet distribution, average wages of employed workers in
sector s and local labor market i are given by



























where γg = Γ ((θg − 1)/θg), Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function and Lgi,s/L
g
m represents
the allocation of employed labour across sectors and local labour markets.
Average wages increase in the average human capital and wages per efficiency unit but
decrease in the share of workers. This negative selection effect describes how changes in
the within-type composition affect the average human capital level. A higher between-type
comparative advantage T gi,s attracts more workers, but also from the lower parts of the
human capital distribution. As a result, the average human capital level Hgi,s decreases
in the share of workers self-selecting into occupation s in region i (see Appendix I.1 for
details). Wage income is taxed at the local rate Ti in region i to finance local public
goods as well as transfers, such that after-tax income of employed workers is Igi,s (ω) =
(1− Ti)W gi,s (ω).
Expected utility. Using the fact that the maximum of a Fréchet-distributed random
variable is itself Fréchet distributed, we derive the expected indirect utility of type-g























which is increasing in real wages, local public goods, and preference shifters in all region-
sector pairs. Perfect worker mobility ensures that expected utility in the market sectors is
equalized everywhere in the economy.
Labor supply. Given the assumptions on the functional form of the human capital
distribution, we get closed-form solutions for labour supply in spatial equilibrium. The






























The attractiveness of region-sector pairs increases in type-specific preferences ηgi,s, local
public goods, and real wages, which in turn are a function of average human capital, wages
per efficiency unit, and regional price levels.
C.3 Home market sector
In the first stage, all workers Lg decide whether to work in one of the M market sectors




i,h in the home market sector receive
a cash transfer Ī > 0 from their local government instead of a market wage. The transfers
for non-employed workers are assumed to be constant across labour markets as well as
groups of workers and can be used for local consumption. Non-employed workers who
switch regions get no cash transfer from local governments and in turn cannot consume,
which ensures that it is never worthwhile for them to move across local labour markets.
Extensive labour supply Building upon eq. (3) the indirect utility of home market
workers of type g in region i is given as


















ϕgi (ω) , (8)
where we assume that the indirect utility of home market workers is shifted by an individual
preference shifter ϕgi (ω). Workers join the home market sector as long as achievable
indirect utility (8) exceeds expected utility in the market sectors (6), such that there












2The probabilities in (7) follow a similar form as the choice probabilities in discrete choice models
under Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distributions (Mcfadden, 1974). See section I.1 in the Online
Appendix for details.
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Intuitively the cut-off increases in the size of wages, amenities, and public goods in all
regions and sectors of the economy relative to those amenities and public goods achievable
in region i. Worker groups with high average wages have higher cut-offs, leading to fewer
workers in the home market sector.
Idiosyncratic preferences are drawn from a Pareto distribution with a type-specific
cumulative distribution function and region-specific scale parameter Bgi,h:






with εg, Bgi,h > 0. Under these functional assumptions, the extensive labour supply of all



















The group-specific shape parameter of the Pareto distribution εg governs the size of group-
specific labour supply adjustments following shifts in the cut-off ϕ̄gi,h as defined in (9). The
elasticity εg can be decomposed into a group-invariant and an group-varying component,
such that εg = ε̄+ ε̃g g ∈M,F . Finally, we take male workers as the reference group and
normalize ε̃M = 0.
Local public goods and cut-offs. Inspired by the reduced-form evidence highlighted
in section B we allow the scale parameter of the preference distribution to be a function









with φg > 0. A higher provision of local public goods shifts the preference distribution for
the home market sector downwards, thereby increasing the share of workers whose draw
will be below the cut-off for home market participation as defined in equation (9). Again,
we decompose the elasticity φg into a group-invariant and an group-varying component,
such that φg = φ̄ + φ̃g g ∈ M,F , where male workers are taken as reference group and
normalize φ̃M = 0. The size of φg governs the substitution effect, whereby increases in
local public goods provision pull workers into market employment.
C.4 Production in the economy
Firms in all market sectors produce many varieties of intermediate goods. The production
technology of intermediate goods requires labour and land and structures as well as ma-
terials, which consist of inputs from all sectors (Caliendo et al., 2018). Intermediate good
producers vary by their productive efficiency, which we denote by zi,s for each variety.
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Intermediate goods producers. The output of a producer of an intermediate variety
with efficiency zi,s is given by









where hi,s (.) and li,s (.) are the demand for land and structures and labour respectively.
Mi,su (.) denotes material inputs from sector u, demanded by a firm located in region i and
operating in sector s under efficiency zi,s to produce yi,s units of an intermediate variety.
δi,su is the share of materials from occupation u in the production of occupation s in region
i, while δi,s denotes the share of total value added in gross output. We assume constant
returns to scale technology, such that
∑
u∈S δi,su = 1 − δi,s. Finally, the parameter κi,s
denotes the share of land and structures in value added.















where Lgi,s denotes the number of workers of type g employed in region-sector pair {i, s}.
Hgi,s is the average human capital supplied by a worker type and σ
g > 1 denotes the
elasticity of substitution between workers of different types in the production of varieties.
Denoting as ri the rental price of land and structures in region i we obtain the following



























The unit cost for an intermediate good producer with efficiency zi,s is thus λi,s/zi,s.
Given constant returns to scale and competitive intermediate goods markets, a firm pro-
duces only positive amounts of a variety as long as its price is equal to its unit production
cost, where pi,s (zi,s) = λi,s/zi,s.
Trade costs are represented by τij,s and are of the ’iceberg’ type. One unit of any
variety of intermediate good s shipped from region j to i requires producing τij,s ≥ 1 units
in region j. If a good is non-tradable, then τij,s = ∞. Final goods producers purchase
varieties of intermediate goods from the location j in which the acquisition cost, including
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trade costs, is the least. Therefore







where we denote the vector of productivity draws across regions by zs = (z1,s, z2,s, ..., zJ,s).
Final good producers. Intermediate goods demanded from sector s and all regions are
combined into a local CES bundle (final good). Local final goods, in turn, are used as
materials for the production of intermediate varieties and final consumption.
In particular, in the following we denote as Yi,s the quantity produced of final goods
in region-sector pair {i, s} and as ỹi,s (zs) the amount demanded of an intermediate good









where φs (zs) denotes the joint cumulative distribution function for the vector of efficiencies
zs with marginal functions φi,s (zi,s) and where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. There are no fixed costs or barriers to entry in the production of
intermediate and final goods, such that competitive behavior implies zero profits at all
times.
Final good producers minimize total production costs. Using the CES assumption, the














is the ideal cost index for final goods.
Sector-specific efficiencies. We assume that across all varieties, market sectors, and
regions the idiosyncratic productivity levels zi,s are independently drawn from a Fréchet
distribution such that the joint cumulative distribution function is given by







where we normalize the scale parameter to unity, and the occupation-specific shape pa-
rameters νs > 1 govern the variance of efficiency draws. A larger νs implies less variability
across varieties and regions.
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Inter-regional trade in intermediate goods. Given the properties of the Fréchet
distribution, the price of the aggregate good in sector s and region i is







− 1νs , (18)
where γs ≡ νs+1−σνs and Γ(.) denotes the Gamma function. The functional assumptions
on the distribution of efficiencies across regions finally allow to derive the share of total









with Xij,s the expenditure in market {i, s} on sector s goods produced in region j and
Xi,s are total expenditures on goods from occupation s in region i.
3 The cheaper the cost
of production in region-sector pair {j, s} or the bilateral trade cots between region j and
i, the more producers in region i purchase varieties from region j. Bilateral trade shares
finally decrease in the denominator of equation (19), the destination-specific ’multilateral
resistance’ term.
C.5 Market Clearing and Unbalanced Trade
National portfolio. We follow Caliendo et al. (2019) by assuming that there are a mass
1 of rentiers in each region who don’t relocate to other locations. They own the land and
structures in all regions, rent them to firms at local rates, and send their after-tax rents
to a nationwide portfolio.
In return, rentiers in region i receive a constant share ιi from the global portfolio, with∑
i∈J ιi = 1, which creates imbalances between the remittances paid by local rentiers and
their income from the nationwide portfolio. In particular, imbalances are given by

























are total revenues in the nation-
wide portfolio. Hj,u denotes the total input of land and structures in region-sector pair
{j, u}. The national portfolio is used to finance payments to non-employed workers and
the remainder is re-distributed to rentiers. Rentiers spend their entire income from the
national portfolio on local final goods.
Local public goods. Regional governments purchase local final goods from all sectors
at market prices as input for the provision of a local public good Ri, which is produced
3See section (I.2) in the Online Appendix for derivations.
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u = 1. Local final goods are used either for private consumption













where Ei = RiP
R
i > 0 denotes the total expenditure of local governments on final goods
and PRi is the optimal local price level of regional governments, which differs from worker’s
local price level as long sectoral expenditure shares differ for private and public con-
sumption 4. Local governments run balanced budgets and, in the absence of regional
re-distribution schemes, could only use local tax revenues to purchase inputs for the pro-
vision of the local public good Ri.
In fact, Germany runs a massive redistribution scheme, whereby financial transfers
worth more than 53 billion euros are shifted across jurisdictions each year. We, therefore,
follow Henkel et al. (2021) and introduce a between-region transfer scheme, which expands
local governments’ fiscal capacities. Given regional transfers and tax income, the budget
available for local public goods provision is given by












where ρi denotes the transfer rate, that is proportional to total local value added (and is
negative for donor regions and positive for recipients).
Spatial equilibrium. A spatial equilibrium is defined as a set of final good prices Pi,s,
human capital and wages in different market sectors Hgi,sw̃
g
i,s, rental rates ri, intermediate
good prices pi,s (zi,s), consumption choices C
g
i,su (ω), intermediate variety demand ỹi,s (zs),
production of intermediate varieties yi,s (zi,s), demand for input factors (materials, land
and structures, labour of all types) and selection choices of workers, such that
1. Workers optimally choose bundles of final goods from all occupations according to
(1), given region-specific price indices Pi and wages W
g
i,s(ω);
2. Employed workers optimally self-select into sectors and locations according to (7);
3. Workers optimally self-select into market employment according to (10);
4. Intermediate good producers demand materials, labour and structures under unit
prices (14). These productive inputs are used to produce idiosyncratic intermediate
good varieties according to (12) and (13);
4For the quantification of the model we fit expenditure shares of local governments and rentiers βRs to
best explain the observable share of housing in private consumption. See identification step 5 in online
appendix J.2.1 for details.
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5. Final goods producers import intermediates from least cost intermediate producers;
6. Final good producers optimally choose input varieties according to (16) and the price
indices Pi,s;


































where the first two terms denote final consumption demand in region i by local
governments ,rentiers and consumers respectively and where the third term denotes
the demand for goods produced in occupation s and region i as material inputs in
all regions and market sectors;


















j∈J πji,sXj,s are revenues from each export market. Labour market clearing
for all groups g ∈ G, regions i ∈ J and market sectors s ∈M ensures that labour sup-
ply (7) equals labour demand (22). Aggregate labour market clearing for workers of
all groups implies that workers are either in one of the M market sectors or the home-


























Land and structures market clearing for all regions i ∈ J and market sectors s ∈M
ensures that demand for land and structures (23) equals exogenous supply of land





In this section, we describe our main data sources.
Employment. We restrict our analysis to the years 2008-2014 and the 141 local labour
markets of Germany which were originally delineated as commuting zones by Kosfeld and
Werner (2012). Our data consists of employment counts per worker type, industry, and
local labour market per year derived from detailed administrative data from Germany.
To ensure sufficient data coverage across all region-sector pairs, we construct six sectors
(four tradable and two non-tradable, based on ISIC Rev. 4). We use this classification
throughout our paper and refer to it as the ”occupational sectors” (see appendix J.1 for
details).
Wages. To calculate the total wage bill per region and sector, we interact average wages
per worker-type and industry from the National Accounts (EU KLEMS, see Stehrer et
al. (2018)) with region-sector-specific fixed effects. We extract the fixed effects from a
standard Mincerian earnings function (with dummies for three education levels, part-time
employment, a cubic age and experience term, and person fixed effects) in an approach
similar to Card et al. (2013). Individual wage data comes from the weakly anonymous
Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB).5
Material inputs. Information on gross output comes from the Growth and Productivity
Accounts (EU KLEMS, see Stehrer et al. (2018)) and gross value-added per region-sector
pair from the regional economic accounts provided by the Statistical Office of the Euro-
pean Union (Eurostat). We allocate sector-specific gross output across regions according
to region-specific shares of value-added. Information on input-output linkages between
sectors comes from the World Input-Output Tables (WIOD, see Timmer et al. (2015)).
Trade Flows. To allocate the region-sector-specific gross output from the EU KLEMS
database across trading pairs, we use the bilateral trade shares from the Forecast of Na-
tionwide Transport Relations in Germany 2030. It provides information on inter-regional
trade volumes in metric tons between German districts in 2010 (Schubert et al. (2014)).
To match our empirical equivalents of regions and occupational sectors, we aggregate trade
flows to the commuting zone and sector level (see appendix J.1 for details).
Data on taxes and transfers. We use official tax data provided by the German Sta-
tistical Office and the Federal Statistical Office (see Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b);
5This study uses the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (version
1975 - 2017). Data access was provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
The dataset contains information on gross daily wages, education, gender, age, occupation, employment
status, as well as the workplace and location of residence of German workers. To address the censoring of
wages at the social security maximum, we apply the imputation method proposed by Card et al. (2013).
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Statistisches Bundesamt (2021a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021))
to break down tax revenues (Federal, States, and local municipalities) to the local level
and identify the effective degree of fiscal transfers (within and between the Federal States).
We follow the procedure in Henkel et al. (2021) and compute for every district local tax
revenues before and after redistribution (and hence net transfers), aggregate these vari-
ables to local labor markets i and relate them to these regions’ value added to obtain
empirical proxies of the average tax and transfer rates Ti and ρi.
Data on rents and non-tradable prices. We use average land prices provided by the
Federal Statistical Office (see Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021)) as
the empirical counterpart of rental prices in the theoretical framework. To quantify our
model, we consider two sectors of non-tradables: Construction and non-tradable services
(for example, Finance and Insurance, Public Administration, and Education). Ahlfeldt
et al. (2020) provide mix-adjusted regional real estate price indices as panel data for all
German labour markets, which we use as a proxy for price levels in the construction sector.6
For price levels of non-tradable services, we rely on estimates of price level differences by
sector in Weinand and Auer (2020). We control for tradable service prices, aggregate them
to the commuting zone level, and finally re-scale all price indices Pi,ntS such that their
output-weighted average sums to unity.
Data on local public public goods provision. We collect information on local public
good provision from the INKAR (2020) database. To determine a single measure of local
public goods provision, we convert different measures of public goods to a single measure by
taking the first principal component. We include measures of childcare provision, the ease
of reaching the next elementary school, public transportation, motorway, airport, train
station, the share of households with broadband internet access, drinking, and sewage
supply, energy and waste management, as well as publicly financed recreational areas. We
then standardize to give this variable a zero mean and unit standard deviation.
E Quantifying the Model
We quantify our model for all years (2008 - 2014), to obtain a panel data-set for all model-
inverted parameters. We later leverage this time variation to identify the elasticity of
labour supply to regional public good provision. The quantification of the model consists of
two steps. First, we obtain values of the structural parameters {α, βu, βRu , θg, εg, δi,s, δi,su, ιi,
κi,s, φ
g, σg, σ, τij,s, νs, χ}. We estimate the respective values for most parameters using the
structure of the model and observed variables in the data. For the remaining parameters
6The computation of the regional real estate price indices follows the methodology outlined in Combes
et al. (2019). They rely on the micro data-set ”Real-Estate Data for Germany” which is described in great
detail in Boelmann and Schaffner (2019) and originally comes from the internet platform Immobilien Scout
24. See the Online Appendix of Ahlfeldt et al. (2020) for more details.
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{α, σg, σ, νs, χ} we borrow their values from the literature. Second, to identify the pref-




i,s, Pi, Ri} as the unique values
that are consistent with the model in general equilibrium we invert the model using data
together with the estimated parameter values.
E.1 Set parameters
For the elasticity of substitution between men and women in production, we follow Olivetti
and Petrongolo (2014) and use σg = 2.5 as our benchmark, which is in the middle of other
available estimates.7 Accurate estimates of the elasticity of substitution of varieties across
regions are hard to obtain. We therefore borrow estimates from the international trade
literature (see e.g. Bernard et al. (2003)) and set σ = 5 for our main analysis. Finally, as
in Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2019) we set the trade elasticities to νs = 10 for all sectors, which
is well within the range of values considered by Head and Mayer (2014). Lastly, we assume
perfect rivalry for local public goods and set χ = 1 for our main analysis. Assuming χ = 1,
Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) obtain a value of α = 0.16 for the share of local public goods in
the USA, which we also borrow for the quantification of our model.
E.2 Estimated parameters
Shape parameters of human capital distribution. We observe individual wages,
shift them by the share of consumption goods (1− α) and decompose them into group-
specific average wages and individual-specific human capital levels as the residuals to a
wage decomposition according to the following Mincerian wage regression
lnW gi,s(ω) = c
g +X(ω)bg + di + ds + di,s + ln Ψ̃
g
i,s(ω), (24)
where cg is a constant, X(ω) are type-specific controls and di, ds and di,s denote region
and sector dummies as well as their interaction respectively. The residuals Ψ̃gi,s(ω) account
for idiosyncratic human capital levels as suggested by equation (5). Individual controls
X(ω) include interactions of worker’s age, the days in employment, and a dummy for part-
time employment. Under the assumptions on the distribution of individual human capital
draws Ψ̃i,s in equation (4) the residuals from the wage decomposition will be Gumbel-
distributed with group-specific scale 1/θg. We, therefore, fit the distribution of log-wage
residuals Ψ̃i,s (ω) to a Gumbel distribution and identify its scale parameter using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) separately for each worker group. The inverse of the estimate
identifies the shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution and in turn the labour supply
elasticity.
Table 1 summarizes our estimates: in columns (1) and (2) we report the MLE values
for θ̃g ≡ ln (1/θg) that provide the best fit to a Gumbel distribution. Columns (3) and
7Depending on the occupation of workers Bhalotra and Fernández (2018) estimate the elasticity of
substitution between men and women to be between 1.2 and 2.7 in Mexico, whereas Acemoglu et al.
(2004) obtain a slightly larger estimate of 3.
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(4) show the corresponding values of the shape parameter θg. For all years, we find that
idiosyncratic human capital draws of female workers are slightly more dispersed, which
results in a smaller estimate of θg. Furthermore, dispersion in human capital has increased
over the last years for female and male workers, which results in smaller labour supply
elasticities.
Our preferred estimates of the labour supply elasticities (1 − α) ∗ θg = 1.69/1.55 for
the year 2008 (and 1.57/1.50 for 2014) are close to, albeit slightly larger than, existing
estimates: Hsieh et al. (2019) obtain an estimate of 1.52 for the USA, whereas estimates
in Burstein et al. (2019) range from 1.81 to 1.26 when accounting for time trends. In sum,
our estimates are well in line with the cross-country comparison values of 1.05 to 1.47 in
Lee (2020).










2008 -0.70 -0.61 2.01 1.84
(0.002) (0.002)
2014 -0.63 -0.58 1.87 1.78
(0.002) (0.002)
Notes: This table displays estimates of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) of the shape parameter of a Fréchet distribution from individual wage
residuals and a CDF as outlined in eq. (4). Columns (1) and (2) report the
MLE values for θ̃g ≡ ln(1/θg) that provide the best fit to a Gumbel distribution.
Columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding values for the shape parameter θg.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Parameters in production and consumption. To identify model-consistent values
for the parameters {δi,s, δi,su, κi,s, ιi, τij,s, βs, βRs } we rely on region-sector-specific data on
value-added, gross output, input-output linkages, sectoral trade flows, taxes, and transfers,
as well as sectoral wage sums. We calibrate the share of value-added δi,s and the share of
land and structures κi,s to match their existing data counterparts. Next, to determine the
share of sector u goods used in sector s and region i, δi,su, we rely on national input-output
shares δsu, noticing that δi,su = (1 − δi,s)δsu. Moreover, observable trade imbalances pin
down local shares ιi of the national portfolio. Using this calibration, there exist unique
values of expenditure shares {βs, βRs } which ensure that markets clear for all sectors in the
aggregate, given the regional tax and transfer rates. Finally, we derive model-consistent
expenditures of all regions that rationalize goods market-clearing (see identification steps
1 - 5 in online appendix J.2.1 for further details and derivations).
For the non-tradable sectors, we treat trade costs as infinite. For the tradable sectors,
we follow the standard gravity literature (Head and Mayer, 2014) and model trade costs





where distij is the Euclidian distance between the centroids of locations i and j. Following
equation (19), we estimate the combined sector-specific parameter −νsζs using standard
gravity regressions based on bilateral trade flows recovered from the Forecast of Nationwide
Transport Relations in Germany 2030. We find that the estimated distance coefficients
range between −1.43 and −2.14. They are highly statistically significant and firmly in
line with available estimates from the gravity literature Head and Mayer (2014). We then
parameterize trade costs according to equation (25), while setting trade elasticities to
νs = 10 for all sectors. Table 2 summarizes our calibration for these parameters as well
the data sets used to calibrate or estimate them.
Table 2: Production and consumption parameters
Parameter Value Approach Data
δi,s Share of value added 0.30− 0.65 Cal. Trade flows/ value added
δi,su Share of material inputs 0− 0.35 Cal. Input-Output Tables
1− κi Share of wage expenditures 0.06− 0.95 Cal. Value added/ wage income
ιi Share of national portfolio 0− 0.06 Est. Trade imbalances
τij,s Trade cost 1− 1.03 Est. Trade flows
βs = β
R
s Expenditure share 0.001− 0.42 Fit. Equation (48)
Ti Regional tax rate 0.15 - 0.33 Cal. Tax revenues
ρi Transfer rate -0.11 - 0.27 Cal. Transfer payments
Notes: If the approach is ”calibrated” we calibrate the parameter to fit the observable data outlined
under ”data”. If the approach is ”estimated”, we estimate the parameter following the estimation steps
outlined in appendix J.2.1 and using the data sets under ”data”. If the approach is ”fitted”, we fit
parameters to match the model-consistent equations outlined under ”data”.
Unit costs, prices, and human capital. The cost-minimizing behaviour of producers
ensures that bilateral trade flows decrease in the size of unit production costs. The fact
that model-consistent trade flows follow a gravity equation (19), therefore, allows us to
identify the unit costs from model-consistent expenditures Xj,s in all origin regions j ∈ J
demanded by workers in region i. In all tradable sectors, these directly translate into
regional price levels.
We consider two sectors of non-tradables: Construction and non-tradable services (that
is, Finance and Insurance, Public Administration, and Education). As a proxy for price
levels in the construction sector, we use the mix-adjusted regional real estate price indices
from Ahlfeldt et al. (2020). For the aggregate price levels in the non-tradable service sector,
we rely on price level differences estimated by Weinand and Auer (2020). Since unit costs
can only be identified up-to-scale, we normalize them such that the GDP-weighted sum of
regional price levels sums to unity for all sectors.
Finally, we use data on price levels and local rents to identify gender-specific human
capital levels as the residual to unit costs. Intuitively, we fit gender-specific human capital
levels to trade flows and goods expenditures (controlling for differences in wage remuner-
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ation, expenditures on materials and land and structures) implied by the model.8
Amenities and participation costs. Preferences ηi,s for all market sectors come from
equation (7) as the residual to observable labour supply by gender, region, and sector after
controlling for real wages and local public goods. We decompose preferences into an overall
”amenity” term common to all sectors and region-sector-specific participation costs, such
that ln ηi,s = c
g
i −µi,s and with c
g
i a gender-region fixed effect. Since we identify amenities
only up-to-scale, we re-scale them to ensure that the participation costs are positive for all
region-sector pairs. Table 5 presents all model variables, among others the employment
rate and public goods provision per capita in 2008 and the corresponding changes between
2008 and 2014.
Table 3: Model-implied Aggregates
Outcome 2008 2008 2008 Change Change Change
Overall Female Male Overall Female Male
Labour force participation rate 0.771 0.729 0.812 1.048 1.051 1.046
Public good (e), per capita 3304.70 3306.70 3302.90 1.189 1.189 1.190
Unit costs, weighted 1.422 1.357 1.479 0.992 0.991 0.994
Price levels, weighted 3.869 3.871 3.668 0.959 0.959 0.958
Log TFP, weighted 5.186 5.236 5.143 1.059 1.062 1.056
Log human capital, weighted - 9.209 9.978 - 0.999 1.001
Amenities, weighted - 2.592 2.050 - 1.032 1.010
Participation costs, weighted - 1.067 0.780 - 1.029 1.006
(Inverse) participation costs (exp) - 0.347 0.463 - 0.971 0.995
Notes: Labour force participation costs observed in the data. All other variables are solved within the model framework.
Model-implied variables are weighted by group-region employment.
Public good elasticity. To identify the parameters {φg, εg} we analyze the effect of local
public goods provision on gender-specific non-employment rates. We quantify the model
for the years 2008 - 2014 to exploit variation in the variables {Lgi,h,t/L
g
i,t, Īt/Pi,t, Ri,t/Li,t}
within German local labour markets across time using the following regression equation














































are functions of structural pa-
rameters. To estimate the gender-specific components of fiscal capacity and price shocks
8See identification steps 6 - 9 in online appendix J.2.1 for further details and derivations.
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on non-employment we include an interaction term of local public goods provision and a
female dummy in the regression equation (and similarly for price shocks). We control for
the terms cgi + c
g
t ≡ εg(ln Ā
g




t ), with gender-year and gender-region fixed
effects, and finally the terms ugi,t = ε
g(ln B̃gi,t,h + ln Ã
g
i,t) represent deviations from these
gender-region and gender-year fixed effects in regions’ amenities and preference shifters in
year t. We exploit the time variation within German labour market areas’ employment
induced by local fiscal capacity shocks, under the assumption that no changes in local
labour demand had occurred over the time horizon. In other words, we hold local labour
demand Lgi,t−1 constant at its base level (in 2008) while using only the time variation in
tax and transfer rates to identify the parameters {εM , εF , φM , φF }.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 we present the OLS estimates of regression (26).
Over our observed time periods, average non-employment rates decreased, but to a lesser
degree in regions which experienced large increases in fiscal capacities (column (1)). Con-
sequently, following the introduction of time-gender effects, we predict positive deviations
from (negative) aggregate time trends in non-employment rates in those regions (column
(2)). Workers of both workers react differently to fiscal capacity shocks, such that we ob-
tain an elasticity of fiscal shocks to non-employment that is almost 80 percent (= ag2/a1)
smaller for female workers than male workers. Higher regional price levels decrease transfer
payments in real terms and therefore induce workers to join the labour force. The coeffi-
cient estimate of 0.84 is slightly larger for male workers, but not statistically significant.
Taken together the estimates in column (2) would imply that positive fiscal capacity
shocks shift the preference distribution upwards for workers of both genders, such that
both the income and substitution effect work towards pushing workers out of employment
in our framework (as φg < 0). The effect is, however, much larger for male workers.
Instruments. One fundamental challenge for identifying a causal effect is that shocks
to home market preferences would correlate with changes in local public goods provision
and affect the decision of workers to join the labour force. The subsequent outward shift
in labour supply is likely to increase local tax revenue and, in turn, local public good
provision. As a consequence, OLS estimates of the coefficients could be biased downwards
if the fixed effects are not sufficient to capture potential labour supply shocks.
We, therefore, construct a vector of distance-weighted regional shares of toddlers in









By constructing our instrument, we exploit the introduction of the ”Kinderförderungs-
gesetz” (KiföG) in 2008. The goal was to provide the legal right to a public childcare
place for all children over the age of one in Germany. In 2008 the share of toddlers in
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public child care varied substantially across regions. While public child care rates of three
to six-year-old children were already very high before the reform, attendance by one to
three-year-old children was considerably lower, ranging from around 5% in some places
in West Germany to 50% in Eastern Germany.9 To finance the massive investments in
public childcare provision, Germany introduced the so-called Sondervermögen ”Kinder-
betreuungsausbau”. This special fund provided 2.73 billion euros of financial aid for the
federal states and municipalities between 2008 and 2014.10 As a result, local investments
were mainly financed by intergovernmental transfers. Hence, although the program was
national in scope, we can exploit the circumstance that its impact on a given local labor
market depended on the already existing number of local childcare places and the size of
the female labour force. Moreover, the tax burden associated with the investments fell
equally on all residents across local labour markets.
The share of toddlers in public child care in all neighbouring regions impacts local
public goods provision via the numerator in equation (10). Higher childcare provision
rates in other local labour markets will increase expected indirect utility across all sectors
and regions. The preference cut-offs for labour supply will rise in all local labour markets
as long as there is free mobility across space. The identifying assumption is that the
changes in shares of toddlers in public child care in neighbouring regions are exogenous to
omitted local preference shocks for the home market.
To predict gender-specific adjustments to fiscal capacity shocks, we interact the distance-
weighted childcare rates in a given year ˜Childcarei,t with the female dummy. Depending
on the local level of public child care provision, the impact of fiscal capacity shocks on
extensive labour supply will differ across female and male workers. The intuition is that
females rely more on public child care provision than males, as they are still the primary
child-carers. A further problem might be a potential correlation between changes in local
price indices and shocks to local preferences.
To circumvent the additional endogeneity concern, we, therefore, construct Bartik-style










where k ∈ K denotes the tax type and Revi,k denotes tax revenues in labour market
region i ∈ J from tax type k. National revenue shocks (2008-2014) are weighted by
revenues shares that pre-date the observation period.11 The identifying assumption is
that the initial revenue shares from a particular tax type (for example, housing, VAT,
9See Figure 2 in the online appendix.
10See ”Kinderbetreuungsfinanzierungsgesetz vom 18. Dezember 2007 (BGBl. I S. 3022), das zuletzt
durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 14. Juli 2020 (BGBl. I S. 1683) geändert worden ist”.
11The year 2004 is the earliest year for which information on tax revenues are available to calculate tax
revenue shares. In the Online Appendix we show that our results do not depend on the year for which we
calculate the initial tax revenue shares due to its high persistence over time.
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business, or income tax revenues) are exogenous to omitted shocks to local preferences.
Suppose housing tax rates are initially high in region i then the local government would
strongly depend on housing tax revenues for fiscal capacities. Our instruments, therefore,
would predict higher effects of national house price growth on regional house prices in
region i relative to all other local labour markets. The first stage results are reported in
Table 2 in section J.3 of the Online Appendix. All instruments have considerable power.
Column (4) of Table 4 presents the IV estimates of regression (26), using the Bartik
instruments and distance-weighted childcare rates, as well as their respective interactions
with the female dummy. Estimates of the elasticity of fiscal shocks to non-employment
slightly increase when we include our instruments. Furthermore, the estimated IV effect
on real payments to non-employed workers is significantly higher than under OLS. In our
model framework, these estimates imply that a positive fiscal capacity shock shifts the
preference distribution downwards for workers of both genders, such that the income and
substitution effect work now in opposite directions (as φg > 0). The model-consistent
substitution effect is, however, 50 percent higher for females than for males and almost
cancels out the income effect.
The estimates imply that an increase in fiscal capacity per capita by 1 percent is asso-
ciated with a decrease in non-employment gaps, that is male-to-female non-employment
rates, by about 1.22 percent. Given the average increase in fiscal capacities per capita
by around 14 percent at the local level - that is, around 1433 Euro - between 2008 and
2014, this corresponds to a decrease in employment gaps of roughly 17 percent, which
corresponds to a reduction of around 1.34 percentage points.
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Table 4: The effect of public goods provision on non-employment: OLS and
IV estimates
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Ri,t/Li,t−1) -0.68
∗∗∗ 1.26 ∗∗∗ -1.21 ∗∗∗ 1.40 ∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.21) (0.09) (0.49)
ln(Ri,t/Li,t−1)× Female 0.23 ∗∗ -1.00 ∗∗∗ 0.53 ∗∗∗ -1.22 ∗∗
(0.10) (0.23) (0.11) (0.54)
ln(Īt/Pi,t) -2.51
∗∗∗ 0.84 -1.42 ∗∗∗ 11.56 ∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.69) (0.17) (3.01)
ln(Īt/Pi,t)× Female 1.01 ∗∗∗ -0.30 0.01 -7.42 ∗∗
(0.35) (0.74) (0.20) (3.37)
φM -0.10 -4.44 -0.71 0.06
φF -0.12 -0.12 -0.32 0.12
εM -2.82 0.27 -1.43 13.76
εF -1.71 0.94 -1.49 4.93
Region-gender fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year-gender fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 1974 1974 1974 1974
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates in columns (1) & (2) and the IV
estimates of the second-stage in columns (3) & (4) for the structural param-
eters entering the extensive labour supply equation (26), as well as model-
consistent values for the elasticities {φg, εg} implied by these estimates given
the parameter restriction α = 0.16 and χ = 1. Variables in columns (3) &
(4) are instrumented by distance weighted leave-one-out shares of toddlers
in public child care, and Bartik-style tax-class instruments, as well as their
interactions with a female dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered at the level of 141 local labour markets. + p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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F Counterfactual analysis: Abolishing fiscal transfers
To investigate the employment effects of local public goods provision and fiscal transfers in
practice, we simulate a counterfactual scenario without fiscal transfers across regions. In
that scenario, there are substantial shocks to fiscal capacities because solely tax revenues at
the local level finance the provision of public goods. In doing so, we quantify the aggregate
economic consequences from local public goods provision on the employment decisions of
female and male workers and characterize the spatial implications of fiscal transfers for
gender employment gaps.
Procedure of the counterfactual analysis. In the baseline version of our counter-
factual analysis, we assume fixed values of all structural parameters and use inverted
exogenous components of preference shifters, amenities, and human capital levels as in
the initial equilibrium (that is, in the year 2014). We then set the fiscal transfer rate to
zero for all local labour markets ρ = 0 ∀i ∈ J and solve for the new equilibrium values of
wages, employment, and prices, which rationalize a spatial equilibrium in the absence of
fiscal transfer re-distribution. The new (counterfactual) equilibrium values of real wages,
employment gaps, and rents ensure that all goods and factor markets clear in the new
equilibrium (see section K.1 in the Online Appendix for details).
Regional effects. The abolition of the fiscal transfer system implies massive fiscal re-
distribution, in particular from East- to West-Germany. As highlighted in panel (a) of
Figure 4, fiscal budgets decrease by up to 20 percent in terms of local value-added in some
rural Eastern German labour markets. There is also a clear tendency to redistribute funds
to the largest metropolitan areas in West Germany (for example, Hamburg, Frankfurt, or
Munich) since these regions currently contribute the most to the fiscal transfer system.
Negative fiscal revenue shocks directly affect the capacity of governments to supply local
public goods, which in turn triggers workers to re-consider their initial residence and
labour supply decisions. Workers relocate to regions with higher public good provision, as
highlighted in Panel (b) of Figure 4. As workers move to the positively treated regions,
they impose downwards pressure on local wages per efficiency unit determined by the
interplay of labour supply and demand. Changes in the within-type regional and sectoral
composition magnify this effect via changes in average human capital levels. Panel (d) of
Figure 4 depicts declining real wages in previous donor regions such that regional utility
is again equal across space in the new counterfactual equilibrium. Finally, labour force
participation rates decrease in former donor regions, while recipient regions in Eastern
Germany are predicted to experience higher rates (Panel b).
Aggregate effects and gender gaps. To highlight the aggregate effects of fiscal trans-
fers, we compute the relative changes in aggregate outcomes as highlighted in Table 5, using
employment shares as weights. In doing so, we distinguish between initial recipient regions
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Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: Regional effects
(a) Size of fiscal transfer shock (b) Population change
(c) Change in participation rates (d) Real wage change
Notes: Panel (a) displays changes in fiscal transfer rates, which are defined as fiscal transfers over local
value-added. The Panels (b) to (d) display percentage changes in total population, employment, and real
wages. Real wages are defined as employment-weighted wages over model-consistent regional price levels.
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(where ρi > 0) and donor regions. We observe a sizable worker outflow, with recipient
regions losing 6 percent of their total population and with displacement effects being even
larger for male workers. Out-migration decongests local labour markets in recipient re-
gions, thereby increasing real wages by almost 3 percent. Worker employment, especially
of male workers, increase in former recipient regions, since the income effect outweighs the
substitution effect. This result is, however, attenuated by endogenous preference shifter
increases.
Average welfare (of employed workers) decreases marginally for both worker groups
after abandoning the fiscal transfer scheme. Recipient GDP, meanwhile, decreases and
falls by around 2 percent due to out-migration. Aggregate decreases in labour force par-
ticipation explain the slight fall of GDP also in the aggregate.
In Panel (a) of Figure 5 we highlight how the existing fiscal re-distribution system has
amplified regional differences in gender employment gaps. We find that a one percent-
age point larger fiscal transfer rate decreases employment gaps between female and male
workers by 0.44 percent when incorporating all general equilibrium effects. This, however,
comes at the expense of larger gender wage gaps by 0.5 percent for each 10 percent in-
crease in transfer rates (see Panel (b)). Gender differences in average wages decrease in
all regions, while this effect is slightly more pronounced in initial donor regions.
Table 5: Aggregate effects of fiscal transfers
Outcome Overall Overall Overall ρ > 0 ρ > 0 ρ > 0
All Female Male All Female Male
Population 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.942 0.957 0.928
Labour force participation rate 0.991 0.993 0.989 1.012 0.999 1.025
Price levels 1.002 1.002 1.002 0.998 0.998 0.998
Average wages, weighted - 1.001 1.002 - 1.026 1.027
Preference shifter, weighted - 1.005 1.004 - 1.022 1.012
Welfare (employed) - 0.997 0.997 - 0.997 0.997
GDP 0.994 - - 0.978 - -
Gender employment gap 0.996 - - 1.026 - -
Notes: This table reports changes in aggregate outcomes (using group-region-specific employment shares as weights)
when fiscal transfers between locations are abolished. All numbers in the table represent counterfactual values over
initial values (in 2014). Initial donors have a negative transfer rate, ρ < 0, while recipients have a positive transfer
rate.
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Figure 5: Changes in gender gaps
(a) Changes in employment gaps
(b) Changes in wage gaps
Note: This figure displays the changes in gender gaps when fiscal transfers between locations are abolished. Panel
(a) shows the counterfactual changes in employment gaps (defined as male-to-female employment rates) against the
initial transfer rate. Panel (b) plots changes in gender wage gaps (defined as male-to-female average wages) against
the initial transfer rate. Average wages are the employment-weighted sum across sectors. Note that donors have
a negative transfer rate, ρ < 0 marked by crosses (in blue). Recipients with positive transfer rates are marked by
circles (in red).
G Conclusion
Gender differences in labour market outcomes declined substantially across many indus-
trialized countries over the last decades. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little work
on the equilibrium effects of local public goods provision (in general) and childcare pro-
vision (in particular) for this development. In this paper, we investigate the impact of
fiscal capacities on differences in male-to-female employment rates and the distribution of
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economic activity across space.
In our empirical part of the paper, we find that a higher local public goods provision
increases the non-employment of male workers, but barely affects female workers. We
thereby exploit the time-variation in local fiscal capacities, proxied by trends in childcare
rates in neighboring regions. Using this strategy, we estimate a negative effect of local
public goods on gender employment gaps, since male workers react stronger to fiscal shocks.
Our estimates imply that a one percent increase in fiscal capacities per capita lowers gender
employment gaps by about 1.22 percent.
Because higher local fiscal revenues create externalities for other regions via labour
mobility and trade linkages, the implied aggregate effects of transferring fiscal revenues
across local labour markets are unclear ex-ante. In the theoretical part of the paper,
we set up and quantify a spatial equilibrium model featuring costly trade and labour
mobility to isolate the effects of local public goods provision and fiscal transfers on the
aggregate economy in general and gender gaps in particular. In a counterfactual scenario,
where we shut down current fiscal transfers in Germany, massive fiscal resources are shifted
from poor (low-productive) to rich (high-productive) locations, thus raising average labour
productivity. However, male workers experience greater increases in employment induced
by changes in local fiscal capacities than female workers, such that the abolition of transfers
leads to larger differences in male-to-female gender employment gaps.
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Stehrer, Robert, Alexandra Bykova, Kirsten Jäger, Oliver Reiter, and Monika
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ONLINE APPENDIX
This section presents an Online Appendix containing complementary material.
H Motivation appendix
Figure 1: Gender-specific employment rates and local fiscal capacities per
capita
(a) Employment (b) Non-Employment
Note: This figure plots demeaned log (non-)employment rates (relative to the regional and year specific mean) against
the identically demeaned fiscal capacity per capita. Both variables are normalized by the working-age population
in 2008. Fiscal capacities measure available tax revenues after fiscal redistribution. Local tax revenues and transfer
payments are based on own calculations. We follow the approach in Henkel et al. (2021) to calculate fiscal capacities
as the sum of local tax revenues before redistribution and regional transfer payments (that is, negative for donors
and positive for recipients). The employment rate measures the number of female (male) workers in the labour
force relative to the total number of females (males) in the working-age population (15-65 years) in the local labour
market. The size of the marker is proportional to the regional population size in 2008. Data comes from INKAR
(2020) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2021b,a); Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021a).
I Theory appendix
I.1 Worker side
I.1.1 Distribution of utilities in market sectors
From (3) indirect utility for working in region i and working in sector s is given as:





















There are d = 1, .., D possible region-occupation pairs {i, s} (with D = JxM) where
workers can self-select and sort into. Workers choose the region-occupation pair d that
maximizes idiosyncratic utility.
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We then define as F g(v1, ..., vD) the cumulative distribution function of indirect utilities
for workers of type g:
F g(vd) = P
(
































































Under the functional assumptions on the distribution of idiosyncratic human capital
draws (4) the joint distribution of utility is
























is a function of group-specific
preference components, wages per efficiency unit, human capital, local public goods and
regional price levels for region-occupation pair {i, s}.
I.1.2 Expected utility
We are interested in the expected utility of individuals of a group g if employed workers




































































































where Γ (.) denotes the Gamma function. The expected utility of workers is then equalized
























We are interested in the probability that a choice of region-occupation pair d is the maxi-
mum among all alternatives:
Lgd
Lgm

























































Equation (7) follows directly.
I.1.4 Average human capital under selection and sorting
Finally, we derive the average human capital supplied by workers of type g in all region-
























































from which we derive average wages under selection and sorting.
I.2 Production side
I.2.1 Derivation of unit costs
In this appendix, we derive optimal unit costs under the imperfect substitutability of
labour types. Intermediate good producers minimize costs, which yields the following




λi,s (zi,s) yi,s (zi,s)
δi,su =
Pi,uMi,su (zi,s)























and λi,s (zi,s) denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the cost minimization problem, which
in our problem corresponds to the unit cost of inputs as well. This allows deriving type-









Substituting into li,s we obtain optimal labour demand as:


















)σg−1 = W gi,sLgi,s (zi,s)λi,s (zi,s) yi,s (zi,s) .
Plugging the optimal input factor demands into the production function we derive unit





























I.2.2 Derivation of the ideal cost index
In this appendix we derive the ideal cost index Pi,s, following the steps outlined in Eaton
and Kortum (2002). Let Gij,s (p) be the probability that firms located in region j can
offer producers in region i an intermediate variety for a price lower than p. Under the
assumptions of perfect competition and a Fréchet distribution of productivities it then
holds that:














Producers in region i buy intermediate varieties from least cost origins. The probability
that producers in region i end up paying a price less than p for the variety is








−νs is a function of unit costs of production and bilateral
trade costs.
Substituting the distribution of prices into the ideal cost index yields:
P 1−σi,s = νsΦi,s
∫
pνs−σ exp {−pνsΦi,s} dp.

















The ideal cost index is therefore derived as
Pi,s = Γ
(









as in equation (18).
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I.2.3 Trade shares
We are interested in the fraction of region-i expenditure accruing to region j in all sectors.
Define as πij,s the probability that region j is the least-cost provider of a variety for use
as intermediate input in region i and sector s:
πij,s = Pr
{







(1−Gin,s (p)) dGij,s (p)
















The expression implies that regions with lower unit costs will comprise a larger fraction
of the number of varieties sold to region i. Note that the fraction of varieties sold to
region i from region j need not generally equal the fraction of i’s expenditure spent on
region j varieties. Nonetheless, under the assumption that efficiencies follow a Fréchet
distribution, it turns out that it does, due to the fact that the distribution of prices for
region i is independent of the origin (Eaton and Kortum (2002)).
As a result the fraction of varieties that final good producers in region i and sector s










where we denote as Xij,s the expenditure spent by final good producers in region i and
sector s on intermediates produced in region j and Xi,s are total expenditures.






















I.3 Aggregate equilibrium under selection and sorting
The spatial equilibrium of the model is summarized by the following 12 equations in 12
sets of model-implied variables (prices Pi, Pi,s, λi,s, ri, w
g


































































































πji,sXj,s (Demand for materials: J x M
2 eqs.) (36)












−νs (Trade shares: J









































δi,su ( Production: J x M eqs.)
(39)
I.4 Total factor productivity






























, such that group-specific employment is weighted by its
relative productivity. Note further that we can express the real cost of the input bundle











where τii,s = 1 by assumption. As in Caliendo et al. (2018), the shares πii,s govern the
negative selection effect: if there is a decrease in unit costs in {i, s}, then this region-sector
pair subsequently produces a greater variety of intermediate goods, since the demand for its
goods from all pairs {j, u} has risen. However, the idiosyncratic productivities associated
with those new varieties of intermediate goods are smaller than those of varieties produced
before the change, partially offsetting the initial drop in λi,s.







ln Γ (γs) + lnPi,s −
1
νs




















Combining with equations (40) we derive total factor productivity in all region-occupation
pairs only as a function of demand shifters,human capital and the selection effect:
lnAi,s =δi,s (1− κi,s)











ln Γ (γs) .
(41)
Note that equations (41) nest the expression for total factor productivity in Caliendo et
al. (2018) as the special case of with only one group of workers and human capital shifters










) ∀f 6= g ∈ G. In order to derive the group-specific TFP component,

























and δ̂i,s ≡ σ
g(1−κi,s)δi,s
σg−1 . Region-
group-specific TFP is decreasing in the selection effect, but increasing in the weighted
sum of group-specific human capital Hgi,s across all groups.
Note that these weights are governed by the between-group distribution of employment:
in region-sector cells with a similar number of employed workers (e.g. L̃fi,s → 1), the human
capital of all groups receives the same weights (e.g. ξgi,s = ξ
f
i,s = 1).
Similarly, as long as there are more workers of the other group employed in region-
occupation pair {i, s} (e.g. L̃fi,s > 1), own-group productivity H
g
i,s is weighted upwards as
workers are imperfect substitutes in the production of intermediates.
I.5 Illustrating examples
To illustrate the main components of our model framework we first abstract from worker
mobility in the first two illustrating examples 12 therefore restrict analysis to a one sector-
one region framework.
No substitution effect. In order to highlight the classic trade-off between higher tax
basis, local public good provision and labour force participation, we first abstract from
the substitution effect and set φg = 0 for all worker groups.
Combining equations (6) and (10) yields a log-linear relationship between average
wages in region i ∈ J and labour force participation rates in the one-region-one-sector
12Given that German workers move between labour markets on average only once over their whole
employment history (Ahlfeldt et al., 2020), this seems a good first-order approximation to work out the
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Nominal wage increases pull workers into the labour force, thereby raising labour supply.
Furthermore, differences in preference shifters solely explain gender-specific components
of labour supply schedules in this simplifying example.Financing local public goods then
requires higher tax rates, which disincentivizes workers to supply labour by decreasing real
wage income and shifts labour supply upwards.
The corresponding log-linear labour demand schedule is derived from equation (22)
such that:

















∀f 6= g ∈ G
High average human capital (relative to the other worker group) pushes up the demand
schedule. The labour demand elasticity is governed by the elasticity of substitution be-
tween the different worker groups.
Income versus Substitution effect. Inspired by the empirical literature on the impact
of local public provision on labour supply decision, we next allow preferences to shift
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∀f 6= g ∈ G the relative average wage of worker groups. The ”substitution
effect” both changes the intercept and the slope and even more so for female workers.
The total effect of changes in regional tax revenue is therefore unclear: it decreases labour




This section complements Section E in the main paper. For the model quantification, we
require five sets of data compiled for consistent spatial units and sectors: Employment,
non-employment, wages, bilateral trade flows, and value-added for each region-sector pair.
Additionally, we use data on region-specific land rents and aggregate price levels to derive
prices and unit costs of non-tradable sectors.
Employment. To quantify the model, we require information on the number of workers
of both genders Lgi,s employed in labour market i and sector s. Employment data is
available from the Federal Employment Agency (”Bundesagentur für Arbeit”) via their
online regional database Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2021b) for all
NUTS-3 regions. In our main analysis, we focus on the 141 commuting zones as the
empirical equivalent to the regions i, j of the model framework (Kosfeld and Werner,
2012) and use the Standard Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC, Rev. 4) to
construct six ”occupational sectors”, which we use as the data equivalent to the ”sectors”
introduced in the model framework. Table A 1 summarizes how we aggregate ISIC 4
Sectors into ”occupational sectors”. Sectors 1-4 are tradable, whereas sectors 5 and 6
consists of non-tradables.




Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Agriculture A
Mining and Quarrying
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Mining and Quarrying B,D,E
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation
activities
Manufacturing Manufacturing C
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Transportation and Storage Wholesale/ Retail Trade G-J
Accommodation and food service activities
Information and communication
Construction Construction F
Financial and insurance activities
Real estate activities
Professional, scientific and technical activities
Administrative and support service activities
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Non-tradable and Non-market Services K-U
Education
Human health and social work activities
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Other service activities
Activities of households as employers
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
Notes: This table displays the six sectors: Agriculture (A), Mining (B/D/E), Manufacturing (C) Wholesale/Retail Trade (G - J), Construction (F) and
Non-tradable and non-market services(K - U). Sectors 1 - 4 are tradable sectors, sectors 5 & 6 are non-tradable sectors.
Trade flows. The identification of bilateral trade costs and gross regional output require
information on the entirety of inter-regional trade flows for all tradable sectors to match
the expenditures in the model,
∑
j∈J πji,sXj,s. The Clearing House of Transport Data at
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the Institute of Transport Research of the German Aerospace Center provides information
on the entirety of bilateral trade volumes that went through German territory for the year
2010 in their final report for the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations in Germany
2030 (’Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030’, henceforth VVP).
As an input to the theoretical model we require trade values rather than volumes, so
we convert the data by using appropriate unit values. We base our measure of region-
sector-specific unit values on actual output data, such that the information on the volume
of bilateral trade flows obtained from the VVP directly matches measures of aggregate
region-sector-specific output. We aggregate trade data to the level of labour market regions
and ISIC Revision 4 to match our classification of region-sector pairs.
J.2 Identification of model variables
J.2.1 Identification steps
Our strategy for identifying preferences and average human capital builds upon the strat-
egy outlined in Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2019). The identification of model-implied variables
from the data takes places in several steps:
1. Use data on value added, gross output and input-output linkages to derive
model-consistent values δi,s, δi,su, κi for all region-sector pairs
(a) Share of value added for all region-sector pairs
Expenditures on wages as well as land and structures in region-sector pair {i,s}











such that the parameters δi,s can be identified by the fraction of value added
over gross regional output in each region-occupation pair.
(b) Shares of material inputs δi,su for all regions and sectors
Note, that in the aggregate economy total trade flows equal aggregate expen-














where we define as δsu the share of economy-wide material inputs of goods from
sector u used in the production of goods from sector s. We observe material
inputs in the production of goods from each sector from the World Input-Output
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Tables (Timmer et al. (2015)) at the aggregate level. We, however, cannot
observe material inputs by sectors separately for each region. We therefore
assume that in all regions the value of materials u ∈ S used as inputs, relative





The regional share of material inputs is therefore determined as:
δi,su = (1− δi,s) δsu.
(c) Fraction of value-added accruing to workers













2. Derive expenditures on land and structures and trade imbalances for all
regions






















Trade imbalances after re-distribution are finally defined as













3. Determine regional shares of national portfolio
To determine the regional shares of the national portfolio we match the trade im-
balances implied by the model ΥMi to the observed imbalances Υ
D
i in the data.







subject to the constraints ιi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i∈J ιi = 1.
4. Calculate model-consistent expenditure shares βs and β
R
s for all sectors
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Given aggregate wage data, employment data and parameter values for ρi and ti
as well as for δi,s ,κi,s and δi,us obtained from identification step 1 we solve for
model-consistent expenditure shares {βs, βRs } which imply aggregate sector-specific
goods market clearing. We hereby assume that local governments and rentiers do
not consume housing, but otherwise distribute expenditures similarly as workers
across the remaining sectors. This allows to fit private expenditures shares better
to observable housing expenditures shares in Germany, under the restriction that
goods markets still clear in all regions and sectors (48).
5. Calculate total expenditures on tradables


































which we solve for using the model-consistent expenditure shares {βs, βRs } from iden-
tification step 4.
6. Calculate relative unit cost shares λ̃i,s for all tradable goods
Substituting the expressions for trade shares (38) as well as the calculated values for




















implied by the structure of trade flows. Unit costs can be identified from equations
(49) as smaller relative unit costs imply that a region i is the least-cost producer for
a larger number of varieties which increases trade shares towards all regions j ∈ J .
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where nt ∈ S ⊂ M denotes sectors from the subset of market sectors that are
non-tradable.
7. Compute sector-specific price levels for all tradable goods
Substituting relative unit costs λ̃j,s into price equations (37) allows to solve for the
ideal region-sector-specific cost indices Pi,s:




















νs are sector-specific constants to be determined by normal-
ization.
We choose a model-consistent normalization on aggregate sector-specific cost indices:
Ps ≡
∑
i∈J Pi,sπi,s = 1 ∀s ∈ TR, that is we define sector-specific cost aggregates as




are the share of total spending in occupation s, that accrues
to region-i expenditures. Applying the normalization we solve for the occupation-
























We subsequently calculate ideal cost indices relative to a weighted average of costs























Using the normalization for aggregate occupation-specific cost indices once again,






















8. Compute price levels in all regions for all non-tradable goods









where the price level of tradable services Pi,tS and the consumption shares of tradable
and non-tradable services {βtS , βntS} follow from the previous steps. In all non-
tradable sectors it holds that τij,s → ∞ for all regions j 6= i, such that price levels
simplify to:
Pi,nt = Γ (γs)
1
1−σ λi,nt.
Using regional price data for our choice of non-tradable sectors we subsequently solve
also for unit costs in these sectors.
9. Compute average human capital as compensating differential to unit costs















































Applying the fact that relative human capital H̃gi,s sums to unity in all region-sector






















Intuitively, relative human capital is predicted to be larger if, controlling for differ-
ences in wages, there is large demand for group-specific employment.
The levels of human capital can be identified from observable values of aggregate
production in all region-occupation pairs. Combining equations (39) with labour
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where we substituted the definition for relative human capital.
Re-arranging terms yields gender-specific average human capital that is increasing
























10. Compute preferences as compensating differentials to labour supply
Regional price levels are a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of sector-specific prices by equa-
tion (30). Given sector-specific unit cost levels (51), as well as data on wages W gi,s,
tax rates, public goods and average human capital T gi,s, preferences η
g
i,s are recovered






























Spatial variation in real income identifies average group-specific preferences up to a
group-specific constant for each region-sector pair {i, s} as long as there is perfect
worker mobility both across regions and sectors, which implies group-specific utility
equalization.
11. Compute preference shifters for the home market
We use estimates for the elasticities of non-employment to local public good provision
φg and shape parameters εg to recover the region-group-specific scale parameters of




























In this appendix, we highlight the spatial distribution of our model-inverted variables and
run several over-identification checks.
Public good elasticity. This section presents the first-stage regression results of regres-
sion equation (26). Real non-market earnings only react to the main Bartik shift-share
instrument with an estimate of 0.34. Local public goods provision, however, is responsive
to both the vector of distance-weighted regional childcare provision rates and the Bartik
instrument, with estimates of 0.54 and 0.09 respectively, whereas the interactions of the
instruments with the female dummy do not have any predictive power. As expected, the
interaction term of real non-market earnings with the female dummy only reacts to the
interaction of the Bartik instrument and the female dummy, whereas both interaction
instruments explain the public good interaction term.
Table 2: The effect of public goods provision on non-employment: First-
stage
ln(Īt/Pi,t) ln(Ii,t/Li,t−1)× Female ln(Ri,t/Li,t−1) ln(Ri,t/Li,t−1)× Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
InstCHILDi,t -0.00 -0.00 0.09
∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
InstCHILDi,t × Female 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)
BtkTAXi,t 0.34
∗∗∗ 0.00 0.54∗∗ 0.00
(0.07) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00)
BtkTAXi,t × Female -0.00 0.34∗∗∗ 0.00 0.54∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.30) (0.22)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
F-statistic instrument 14.75 7.57 53.49 27.72
Observations 1974 1974 1974 1974
Notes: This table reports the first-stage results of the IV estimates. The dependent variable is the log non-
employment rate, and the endogenous variables are the log real non-market earnings and the log real tax
revenues. These are instrumented with distance-weighted leave-one-out childcare provision rates, Bartik-style
tax-class instruments, and their respective interaction with a female dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the level of 141 local labour markets. + p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure 2: Spatial disparities in childcare rates
(a) Childcare rates
Notes: This figure plots the geographical pattern of fiscal capacities per capita across the 141 German
local labour markets (Kosfeld and Werner, 2012) in 2008. Data comes from the INKAR (2020) database.
Darker shading indicates higher values.
K Counterfactual appendix
K.1 Procedure
To implement the counterfactual we hold parameter values
{α, βu, βRu , θg, εg, δi,s, δi,su, ιi, κi,s, φg, σg, σ, τij,s, νs, χ} at their level for the year 2014. We
then iteratively up-date guesses for wages per efficiency, rents, prices, and the employment
as well as non-employment distribution until in the counterfactual equilibrium
1. Wages per efficiency clears all labour markets and ensure that labour supply (31)
equals labour demand (33)
2. Rents adjust to clear the market for land and structure
3. Unit cost adjust to ensure that demand equals supply for all input factors in inter-
mediate production
4. Goods markets clear
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